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ABSTRACT

Deganawidah-Quetzalcoatl University (DQU), like most American Indian and Chicano efforts, was not created without serious difficulties. During the first stage of DQU's establishment, from 1961 through the early part of 1970, very little positive response took place. Although hundreds of letters and proposals were sent to tribal leaders, government officials, and private agencies, few Indians were enthusiastic and saw the value of developing an educational philosophy more relevant to their communities. Most were apparently awed by the task's difficulty; non-Indians were usually hostile or indifferent. When acquiring the site (a 650 acre Army Communications Center 7 miles west of Davis), occupation, court action, and public education-lobbying had to be used. The site's occupation by Indian elements ultimately created a new set of problems for the movement which threatened, from time to time, to cause the entire effort to fail. These problems arose because: of the nature of the movement as an alliance of Indians and Chicanos; of the bringing together of adults and youth ranging in age from the upper teens to the early sixties; the movement included both academic (faculty-staff-students) and community people; and of the bringing together of persons with different life-styles and values. Also, the initial funding proved exceedingly difficult because no agency, major foundation, or religious denomination stood ready to provide money. (NQ)

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The Establishment of D-Q University

An Example of Successful Indian-Chicano Community Development

by

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Preface

The field of community development is one which offers great potential for oppressed communities, but only when the "facilitators" or "development specialists" pursue a fully democratic, non-elitist program.

We offer this brief study of the founding of D-Q University not as a detailed history but rather as an analysis of the manner in which community development theory and method was applied to this case.

Tragically, the world is full of "saviors," "promoters," and personalistic, careerist individuals who usually succeed in distorting or corrupting projects relating to Native People. The development of DQU stands as a refreshing exception, and also as a model for replication in other places and other spheres.

David Risling
December, 1972

The Establishment of Deganawidah-Quetzalcoatl University:
An Example of Successful Indian-Chicano Community Development

Introduction

Since the completion of the period of armed conquest by Europeans it has been very rare for people of Native American origin (either of "full" or "mixed" descent) to successfully undertake and carry out a complex series of activities designed to create institutions or vehicles intended to have a positive impact upon self-development.

The establishment of Deganawidah-Quetzalcoatl University near Davis, California, may, therefore represent one of the most significant steps taken by native people in North America since at least the 1890's, for the following reasons:

1. The D-Q movement has successfully brought together "Chicanos" (Spanish-speaking persons largely of Mexican Indian descent), English-speaking Cholos(Mestizos), and North American tribal people. The D-Q movement represents the first time that the many different groups of native race in the United States have successfully worked together on a project, despite intergroup tension resulting from the past attempts of elements of both minority groups to "assimilate" into white society.

2. The D-Q movement represents the first time Chicanos have recovered any land from the federal government and the first time Indians have recovered land -- away from an existing reservation -- in many years.

3. The D-Q movement successfully, although at times precariously, brought together persons representing different age groups and different styles of political action, including those favoring "no compromise" confrontation, those favoring "legal procedures," and those favoring a combination of tactics.

4. The D-Q movement represents the first "Pan-Indian" movement (cutting across tribal lines and national boundaries) which has experienced real success, although other movements (such as Alcatraz) did help to focus national publicity on Indian needs.

5. The D-Q movement symbolizes the awakening taking place among Indians and Chicanos; an awakening which is both ethnic and cultural, and illustrates an alliance based on problems common to oppressed peoples in their struggle for liberation.

6. The ideas behind DQU represent a truly significant development in regards to oppressed populations generally, since the D-Q movement is designed to help the entire Indian and Chicano communities and not merely those who seek to conform to dominant economic and social values. In this connection, DQU may well be the first "worker-peasant-intellectual" university in North America, that is, a school firmly rooted in the conditions and lives of the common people (rather than an "escape route" away from the masses).

7. From the Indian perspective at least, DQU may well represent an important religious development, first by providing a center for the teaching of traditional religion, and second, by implementing certain Indian prophecies relating to what is believed by many to be the closing days of the present world.

Most of all, the founding of DQU represents the throwing off of Anglo-American intellectual and cultural domination and the reassertion of the vitality and value of the Indian and Chicano heritages.

The History of the D-Q Movement

The founders of DQU, in their initial proposal, referred back to traditional Indian higher education as their inspiration. They also utilized the example of the Aztec calmecac and the Aztec-oriented university of Tlatelolco (1520's-1560's) to illustrate what Indian people can do if given an opportunity. They had also become aware that Sarah Winnemucca, the brilliant Northern Paiute leader, had dreamed of an Indian teacher's college inthe 1880's and that the Cherokees had almost reached the stage of establishing a college during the same period.

The founders of DQU were, however, even more aware of the failures of white controlled colleges and especially of those attracting relatively large numbers of Indian students (such as Bacon, Pembroke, Arizona State, Brigham Young, New Mexico, and Northeast Oklahoma State), or of Chicano students (such as East Los Angeles, New Mexico, New Mexico Highlands, and Texas Western). They were aware of the high non-white drop-out rates in these schools and of the unwillingness of any white colleges to alter their middle-class orientation and chauvinistic European curriculum.

The first stage in the establishment of DQU lasted from 1961 through the early part of 1970. In 1961-1962 Jack Forbes proposed an "American Indian Studies" major at San Fernando Valley State College, and when that proposal was given no serious consideration, the idea of an American Indian University was conceived. An American Indian College Committee was developed by Jack Forbes and by Mr. and Mrs. Carl Gorman, with other persons participating on a sporadic basis.

By and large the years from 1962 to 1970 were very disappointing ones, from the perspective of the university proposal. Hundreds of letters and proposals were sent to tribal leaders, government officials, and private agencies but very little positive response took place. A few Indians were enthusiastic and saw the value of developing a philosophy of education more relevant to their communities, but most were apparently awed by the difficulty of the task. Non-Indians were usually hostile or indifferent to the proposal. The Bureau of Indian Affairs was opposed; Oliver La Farge's Association on American Indian Affairs was hostile or indifferent, and Senator Henry Jackson of the Senate Interior Committee was in favor of "integration."

One spark of interest existed among the Navajo people, where Dillon Platero helped develop the idea of a Navajo junior college. Eventually Navajo Community College arose out of that interest.

In 1962-64 the Movimiento Nativo-Americano, an early experiment in Indian-Chicano collaboration in southern California, proposed a Mexican-American university. This idea, along with many others originated by the MNA (such as referring to the southwest as "Aztlan"), was apparently premature and lay dormant (as it were) for the next few years.

Meanwhile, Indian people were expressing concern about the educational process. They began to get together and discuss the issues. One of the significant conclusions reached was: contrary to white society labeling the Indian child as a "problem" in the classroom, they found that the problem was with the attitude of the teachers and school officials. That attitude was the product of the failure of the teacher's own educational background which totally ignored Native Americans.

In October 1967, the Ad Hoc Committee on California Indian Education, an all-Indian group, held a statewide conference at North Fork. This group, which later became the California Indian Education Association, advocated the development of Indian-oriented higher education. By 1969, the CIEA endorsed Forbes' proposal for a college of American Indian Studies (to be located on a University of California campus) and had authorized its president, David Risling, to look for surplus property for

an Indian controlled school.

Beginning in the Fall of 1969 Native American Studies programs were initiated simultaneously on the University of California's Davis, Berkeley, and Los Angeles campuses and at Long Beach, Sonoma and Sacramento State Colleges, (the first in the country). All of these programs came about directly because of the temporary fear and guilt feelings induced by several "Third World" student strikes and by student militancy.

By 1970, however, it was clear that the white governing boards, administrators and faculty elites were no longer afraid and that their "guilt" had been sublimated in either the "peace" or "ecology" movements. All of the Native American (and similarly established Chicano) programs began to experience difficulty and many (if not most) Indians and Chicanos began to become disillusioned with the prospect of changing established white institutions.

In the meantime, however, a few Indians and Chicanos had become aware of the potential availability of a 650 acre Army Communications Center site seven miles west of Davis. Preliminary inquires at the time of the Alcatraz occupation brought no response from the government but later both Indians and Chicanos were able to visit the site.

The availability of the above mentioned land, coupled with the growing disillusionment of Indians and Chicanos at the University of California, Davis, made the establishment of DQU a possibility. Several other factors should also be noted, however:

1. The Chicano movement had succeeded in turning the Mexican-American community in an Indian-Mestizo direction, making collaboration with Indians feasible;

2. the awakening of Indian people in California (beginning with the founding of CIEA and United Native Americans in 1967 and 1968) had reached a stage where positive action programs could realistically by undertaken;

3. the idea of a university for Indians and Chicanos was not a total novelty, since many persons had now attended white universities and since several Indian and Chicano colleges were in the talking or initial operational stages; and

4. the federal government had failed to seriously consider the idea of an Indian-controlled university on Alcatraz.

During the summer of 1970 a group of Indians and Chicanos, including faculty, college staff, community people, and students met to plan the university. D-Q University was incorporated on July 13, 1970 and a proposal for the acquisition of the site was prepared.

At this stage other key factors need to be emphasized. First, the Indians and Chicanos included persons familiar with white governmental procedures and with proposal-writing. Second, several earlier proposals relative to Indian higher education, Chicano Studies, et cetera, were available for rapid adaptation to the needs of the new proposal. Fourth, the Indian and Chicano groups at Davis had worked together on other issues and were at a similar stage of disillusionment with the University of California, Davis.

The Struggle to Acquire the Site

It will not be necessary here to review in detail the precise steps involved in the acquisition of the site. It is enough to say that the Office of Surplus Property Utilization of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which possessed the authority to dispose of the site for educational purposes, was predisposed to ignore the DQU proposal

and to award the site to the University of California. The local Congressman, Representative Robert Leggett (Democrat of Vallejo), was also a backer of the rival UCD application and undoubtedly greatly influenced DHEW.

The case which emerged then was a classic one: a group of Indians and Chicanos, without money or political influence, engaged in combat with a powerful bureaucratic agency allied with even more powerful agricultural and political interests.

The Office of Surplus Property Utilization (OSPU) and Rep. Leggett did everything possible to expedite the UCD proposal, including the bending or ignoring of legal guidelines for property disposal. Normally such behavior, so typical of federal agencies dealing with powerless groups, would have succeeded. In this instance, however, the Indo-Chicano group possessed persons knowledgeable as regards procedures and willing to risk their jobs, scholarships, et cetera, to fight to the bitter end. In other words, the "powerless" in this case simply would not entertain the possibility of defeat.

Late in October OSPU moved secretly to grant the site to UCD in spite of a defective application. On October 28, however, U.S. Senator George Murphy, desperately seeking reelection, issued a press release "spilling the beans" about the site going to UCD. This occurred two days before the deadline set by OSPU for finalizing applications. The immediate reaction of the D-Q movement was one of extreme anger, righteous indignation, and resolve to press forward on every possible front.

At this point a complimentary "twin" strategy was developed spontaneously, by the common assent of the DQU people but without any formal "contract" as such. The Indian and Chicano students at UCD (and a few from Sacramento State College and other nearly colleges) resolved to occupy the land with the Chicanos supplying logistical support. These decisions were reached spontaneously by the students without "guidance' or suggestion from non-students. The importance of this decision cannot be overemphasized since the students were risking the loss of their scholarships (almost all were receiving fanancial aid) and possible imprisonment. Indeed, they expected to be arrested.

In the meantime, the older leaders of DQU (most of whom were faculty or staff at UCD) contacted California Indian Legal Services, Inc. and initiated court action to halt the projected transfer of the site to UCD.

The total D-Q movement also moved rapidly to organize popular support by means of public meetings, press releases, lobbying, et cetera. Funds were also raised for two purposes, for general support and for bail money (it was still anticipated that the students would be arrested). Non-Indian and non-Chicano persons in the Davis area were enlisted to help in the effort and several ministers, in particular, provided important assistance in terms of helping to keep the police away, raising funds, and enlisting further support.

Generally, it should be noted that the "liberal" community of Davis did not respond in terms of active support for DQU. Some people with "liberal" reputations were hostile, many were indifferent, and only a relative few gave any active support. The experience showed clearly that the bulk of "white liberals" do not understand Indian and Chicano goals and needs or are threatened by movements led exclusively by non-whites. In any event, the burden of work fell squarely upon a relatively small number of Indians and Chicanos, never numbering more than one hundred, who were actively involved and usually numbering less than fifty.

The details of the effort need not concern us here. Suffice to state that the multiple strategy of occupation, court action, and public education-lobbying succeeded eventually in forcing the University of California to repudiate its own defective application. By January 1971, therefore, DQU was the only legitimate applicant for the site and DHEW

was forced to begin working seriously with the Indian-Chicano leadership. On January 13, the occupation ended and on January 15, 1970 the occupation of the site by Indian and Chicano "guards" was officially agreed upon by DHEW. On April 2, 1971 the deed to the site was transferred to the DQU Board of Trustees in an impressive ceremony.

Several additional points need to be noted. First, DHEW officials (principally Regional Director Robert Coop) initiated a policy in January of actively helping DQU obtain the site. This change of stance was due to factors not fully known by the writers. Probably the new Indian policy communicated earlier by President Nixon was a factor. Possibly also, the fact the DQU was the only applicant was another. Other factors were the political support gained by DQU (fron U.S. Senators and others), the international publicity, the continued occupation, and the personal convictions of Mr. Coop (who seems to have honestly come to believe in the potentiality of DQU).

Second, the University of California administration chose not to actively retaliate against faculty and students involved in the DQU founding. Reportedly, the university police were asked to keep Tecumseh Center (the headquarters of Native American Studies) under surveillance and many persons became convinced that phones and offices were being "bugged" (with no "hard" evidence, however) but otherwise the university administration officially "ignored" the role of its own employees and students.

The apparent "passivity" of the administration may be explainable in terms of a "benign" disposition. More likely explanations are, however, to be found in the fact that some faculty (and even a few administrators) sympathized with the D-Q movement, that DQU conducted an impressive public relations campaign, that DQU had secured evidence of administrative irregularities connected with the application for the site (all of which would have become public had the court case been pressed), that the founding of DQU was a legitimate applied community development project carried out by faculty who had known applied research responsibilities in the community development field, that Jack Forbes was the director of a grant from the Donner Foundation* (funded through UCD) whose purpose encompassed such a project as the founding of DQU and finally, that the Indian and Chicano communities had turned out in such great numbers for two marches on behalf of DQU that it was probably clear that direct action against faculty and students could have led to very serious incidents.

The "People's Park" incident of 1969 in Berkeley illustrates the fact that the University of California has not always been "benign" although officials of the Davis campus have apparently sought to avoid confrontation with students. (It should also be noted that some persons connected with Native American Studies on the UCD campus suspect that some U.C. officials have retaliated against them over succeeding months by making decisions unfavorable to the development and operation of the program. These suspicions cannot be verified, however, because of the inherent difficulty in assigning precise motives to human acts as well as the diffused nature of decision-making in a bureaucracy).

(The founders of DQU tried to be very careful not to utilize State of California property. An office was obtained off-campus and the students frequently worked or met in private apartments).

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* It should be noted that almost no money was available under this grant, since most of the funds had been spent in prior years, however, some clerical support and consultation was provided.

Third, it is interesting that most offers of assistance from UCD personnel came from faculty in the professional or applied fields (medicine and agriculture). Very few "letters and science" faculty volunteered to teach courses at DQU or to help with gaining support. The exceptions were two of the three Chicano faculty on campus, one anthropologist, and one physical education professor and perhaps a very few others. The faculties of the "humanities" areas, the social sciences, et cetera, were apparently indifferent or they were the kind of "intellectuals" who deal with social issues strictly at the "ivory tower" level.

The white people who actively supported DQU included a few non-academic UCD staff, about a dozen housewives, a librarian, a few students, several dozen applied or professional faculty (but only to teach courses, by and large) a few businessmen, four ministers, several reporters and broadcasters, and, indirectly at least, a few law enforcement officers. In otherwords, the white community did not turn out in great numbers to support the movement, and more especially, the letters and science faculty and white students were generally passive. In fact, one UCD faculty person wrote a major foundation opposing the funding of DQU.

The above phenomenon has also been observed by the leaders of other campus-oriented "Third World" movements, that is, that whites who will turn out in great numbers for white led peace marches, et cetera, are often not likely to actively support campaigns organized for, and led by, non-whites.

It should be noted that virtually none of the Black faculty and administrators at UC actively supported DQU and one administrator was reportedly quite hostile. The Black students with one exception, were apparently indifferent. The Asian-American students were perhaps more sympathetic but participated very little. A newspaper published by the minority students together, (The Third World) did give DQU good publicity (as did the regular campus paper to a somewhat lesser degree).

In all fairness, it should be stressed that the Indian and Chicano students did not ask for organized Black or Asian support, in fact they probably would have feared too much involvement as being interference with "their" movement. Nonetheless, one might have expected more voluntary offers of support from other non-whites.

It may well be that the Indian-Chicano people are the most "non-Western" of all minorities in the United States and that their desire for self-determination and "separatism" (if you will) does not sit well with most middle-class Afro-Americans and Asian-Americans.

Finally, it should be noted that the Indians and Chicanos at UCD, had a history of seeking to develop their own institutions on the campus and had clashed directly with the Blacks over the question of "dividing up" (along ethnic lines) an integrated Educational Opportunity Program (dominated by the hostile Black administrator referred to above). The Asians had, by and large, vacillated on the question of division, along with a few "poor whites." With few exceptions, therefore, the Indo-Chicanos and the Blacks were at opposite poles (at Davis) on the philosophical issue of "power" versus "integration."

Internal Problems Faced by the D-Q Movement

The occupation of the communications center site by Indian elements on November 3 (Election Day) ultimately created a new set of problems for the movement which threatened, from time to time, to cause the entire effort to fail. Initially, the occupation was completely under the control of students from UCD and several nearby colleges; within a few hours, however, Indians who had been associated to one degree or another with the Alcatraz and other occupations (and who were non-students or ex-students)

arrived. Many of these newcomers were unaware of the history of the D-Q movement and did not understand or wish to adhere to a multiple strategy of occupation in support of formal acquisition by recognized procedures. Instead, they argued for simple seizure or "liberation" according to a doctrine of "Indian rights" which refused to recognize the legitimacy of negotiating with the white government. To some degree also a few of the newcomers had embraced a style fo Indian life which included the use of drugs and alcohol, and which, if allowed to develop at the site, would threaten the success of the occupation.

Initially the leaders of the occupation were able to discourage the presence of drug users and persons who did not wish to adhere to the purposes of the occupation. They were able to do this because of a combination of fortunate circumstances. First, the student leaders were of high calibre; second, they perhaps had learned something of procedure, stragegy, tactics and leadership principles in the Tecumseh Center Native American Studies program, or elsewhere, and third, morale and esprit de corps was high. Nonetheless, it took a considerable effort, on the part of both students and faculty leaders, to prevent the occupation from adopting a "confrontation philosophy."

As the months wore on, most of the student occupiers were gradually forced to return to their studies and to devote their energies to other matters. The "occupiers," therefore, gradually changed in composition, as non-students and ex-students came to predominate and total numbers dropped. By early 1971 the majority of the "occupiers" were Indians who had not participated in the original occupation, who had never studied at Tecumseh Center, and who were partially unfamiliar with the original goals of the occupation.

Many difficulties developed, the details of which need not concern us here. It is generally recognized that in any effort of this nature there should be discipline and loyalty, for otherwise a movement can either be altered in its purpose or destroyed by unplanned actions. It was difficult to maintain loyalty and discipline, however, when the "occupiers" were largely newcomers who had come to the DQU site on their own, with no one's permission (i.e., as "free agents" in the Indian liberation struggle) The official leadership of DQU could do little to control the situation because their court case prevented them from entering the site and, in any case, the occupation was under student direction.

The Indian students were unable to maintain control over the occupation after the first month or two because few of them were continuously at the site and because, gradually the "occupiers" began to assert themselves as a legitimate power-center in their own right.

It is, of course, not at all surprising that the "occupiers" developed as a distinct group not answering to any other authority. The very fact of their being in occupation and having the ability to greatly embarrass the total movement created a possibility of power acquisition. If they had been fully loyal to the collective leadership they might not have made use of their power, but as explained above, about half were "free agents" having no deep friendship, committments or associations with the bulk of the people in the DQU movement.

Ostensibly the differences which developed between the "occupiers" and those on the "outside" related to such matters as having hot food delivered regularly. In reality, however, the disagreements were much deeper. The "occupiers" felt that they should have a greater say in policy-making (although two were DQU board members) and, more significantly, they distrusted the motives, or disagreed with the objectives of the leadership. In general the "occupiers" wanted to be sure that DQU was to be a truly "grassroots" institution and not merely an Indian-controlled replica of the University of California. Some or all of the "occupiers" were highly alienated from white society (and even Indian society, in a

few cases) and were suspicious of all "white" procedures. One or two had serious problems with alcohol and, perhaps, drugs. It may be that a few had located a resting place where they didn't have to work and where food was free (although not always good). The latter persons may have favored, essentially, developing the site as a kind of "inland Alcatraz" (where people could just do what they pleased, with few responsibilities) rather than as a university. The general character of the "occupiers" was that of persons wanting very much to be truly Indian but few of them having really strong grounding in any particular traditional Indian culture.

As the weeks passed the "occupiers" began to become more and more hostile towards those on the "outside," referring to themselves as the "outcasts of DQU" on several occasions. Many of their grievances and concerns were legitimate since, from their perspective, those on the outside were not doing anything of significance. They failed, however, to see all of the activity going on, activity which was necessary to actually secure legal title to the site (including the obtaining of funds adequate to convince DHEW of the University's future solidarity). It should be said, on the otherhand, that the movement failed to maintain enough constant contact with the "occupiers" and especially failed to offer any on-site instruction in traditional Indian life-ways, strategy and tactics et cetera. The shortage of manpower can be blamed for this failure, but it was failure nonetheless.

Events reached a climax after the site was turned over by DHEW to DQU for supervision, in January. On several occasions the "occupiers" issued ultimatiums and prevented DQU persons from entering the site. Finally, a confrontation occurred when the "occupiers" (and "allies" brought from Alcatraz) tried to prevent a large group of Indians and Chicanos from entering the site for a meeting. After much heated discussion at the locked gates it was agreed to hold an all-Indian meeting to try to settle the differences existing between the "occupiers" and the "outsiders."

The meeting (February 2) was largely successful, in that the majority of the Indians present reached a general consensus. The trustees present agreed to speed up the plan whereby a mass meeting of Indian people would democratically select the Indian half of the Board of Trustees, while, in a different room, the Chicanos would do the same.

On February 21 some 400 Indians and Chicanos, of all walks of life, converged on the DQU site to, for perhaps the first time in history, select democratically and openly the governing board of a university. They chose to retain all of the existing trustees who were present and willing to serve but added to them, to make a total of 32 trustees. Many committees were formed and all internal problems seemed resolved.

Unfortunately, however, the "occupiers" (who had now dwindled in number to about six, and none of whom were students) proved largely uncooperative. The most hostile at times threatened the ability of committees to operate. Finally, however, they got into difficulties with law enforcement agencies and were eventually forced to leave.

The April 2nd "Deed Day," when the deed was formally handed over to the DQU trustees, saw an end to the internal difficulties described above, for the most part.

Analysis of the Internal Problems

It has been necessary to review, even if superficially, some of the internal problems of the D-Q movement, in order to make clear that DQU, like most Indian and Chicano efforts, was not created without serious difficulties.

First, a few problems arose because of the nature of the D-Q movement as an alliance of Indians and Chicanos. Surprisingly perhaps, this factor was of relatively minimal significance for several reasons:

1. Although the occupation was Indian, the Chicanos undertook to raise funds, obtain supplies, et cetera, so that everyone was involved;

2. most persons sensed that there were few, if any, racial differences between the two groups. Individuals in both groups ranged from full-Indian in appearance to Caucasian appearances;

3. it was soon discovered that the cultural, social and political values of the two groups were markedly similar;

4. close personal friendships were forged during many hours of working closely together, and

5. no religious differences surfaced in spite of the fact that virtually all of the Indians were non-Christian while a majority of the Chicanos were, presumably at least, Roman Catholic.

The last element of the "occupiers" included a few persons professing anti-Chicano feelings, however, they were equally hostile towards other Indians following a life style different from that of their own.

In summary, the Indian - Chicano coalition functioned well and has continued to show no signs of diminishing in effectiveness.

Second, occasional problems arose because of the bringing together, in one movement, of adults and youth ranging in age from the upper teens through the early sixties. This proved to be of no real significance, however, confirming the Indian and Chicano belief that the "generation gap," at least, is not one of our more serious difficulties.

Third, a few problems arose because the movement included both academic (faculty-staff-student) types and community people. Again, however, no serious difficulties arose, probably because the staff of Tecumseh Center and most of the Chicano academics were already accustomed to (and dedicated to) working with their communities.

Fourth, the most serious problems arose because of the bringing together of persons with different life-styles and values. This, however, only reached serious proportions when the last group of "occupiers" came to largely represent a highly marginal, anti-social variant of detribalized urban Indian culture. That is, the last group included one or two persons who were unable, or unwilling, to subordinate hostile and violent tendencies to movement loyalty.

On the whole, of course, the D-Q movement was extremely successful, especially so when we consider that the movement commenced "without a dime" and continued to operate with no funds of any consequence through mid-1972. Some of the major factors contributing to the internal success of the movement need to be examined:

1. The movement included a group of persons with many talents and, often, with complementary skills. The most important talents were in the area of inter-personal relations, i.e., being able to work together and encourage an atmosphere of unity.

2. The movement included a wide spectrum of persons but all were deeply committed to Indo-Chicano liberation. Almost all could be categorized as "separatists" or "nationalists" (as opposed to "assimilationists") and virtually all were realists pursuing a moderate-to-radical strategy. A few of the more "conservative" soon became relatively inactive while the "confrontation for the sake of confrontation" people played a minimal role.

3. The movement was democratic and open, with no secret meetings (although small groups met to plan specific aspects of the program).

4. Persons who could not be trusted were not involved in leadership positions, nor were they relied upon for assistance. This included Indian employees of the federal government, Indian employees of OEO-funded programs, and persons known for vacillation under pressure. (This is not to say that all persons in the above categories declined to help, but simply that no reliance was placed upon them).

5. No major Indian or Chicano "politicians," tribal chairmen, et cetera, were involved in the movement. (This prevented, perhaps, "grand-standing" or in-fighting on the part of the leadership).

6. The movement always had the potentiality of success, since people in the movement knew how to grapple, at least in theory, with every kind of legal, tactical, propagandistic, and technical difficulty which arose. In this area one can see the importance of academically trained and/or experienced people working in direct alliance with community people. "Grassroots" people, probably could not have successfully acquired the site in the face of bureaucratic opposition.

Initial Funding

The acquisition of the site from DHEW depended, in part, upon a demonstration that the university could be funded. This proved exceedingly difficult because no agency, major foundation, or religious denomination stood ready to provide money.

It should be stressed that DQU was in no way an "elitist" led movement. None of the Indians or Chicanos involved were "famous" or "powerful." None had ready access to sources of private or government funding.

A major task, therefore, was to establish contacts with sources of money. The vice-chairman of the board, Louis Flores, was ultimately able to secure a grant with the help of fellow Chicanos from the Office of Economic Opportunity, while much-needed immediate funds came from small donations, including the Elliott and DJB Foundations. (The OEO grant did not actually materialize until August 1971 but its existence was a key factor in influencing DHEW).

The matter of funding raises several questions of strategy and tactics. On the one hand, it might have been much better if the D-Q movement had started with a plan presented to the major foundations, denominations, or governmental agenices prior to the initiation of the struggle to acquire the site. Presumably, funds might have been secured early, thus easing or eliminating many subsequent problems.

On the other hand, such a policy would have placed great power in the hands of white elites, who undoubtedly would have bickered over location, board composition, strategy, objectives and so on. Also, the promise of money might have attracted opportunistic elements who, as it was, shunned the D-Q movement because of its painful austerity.

Essentially, it boils down to the fact that the concept of an Indian Chicano university, in the abstract, never appealed to whites with preconceived notions about what was "good" for Indians and Chicanos. Therefore, the people had to go ahead and create the university, depending upon their own resources and what little funding could be attracted from the more forward-looking white-controlled agencies, but even there, always securing the funds on their "own" terms.

It is interesting to note that even today, more than one year after the initial occupation of the site, no national religious denomination or major foundation has awarded a cent to D-Q University.

The Success of DQU

At this writing D-Q University is a solid, irrevocable fact. With very little in the way of funding, a new, probably irreversible tide has begun to flow in the Indian-Chicano world. Volunteers, underpaid staff, and work-study students are building a university from the bottom up, a truly democratic, "people's" university.

The D-Q movement will ultimately serve as a catalyst for change, not only in Indian and Chicano society, but in White, Black and in Asian societies as well. Already, Indians and Chicanos are working to set up branches elsewhere, and white educators are visiting DQU to learn what "innovation" really is. (Commonly, they look at so-called "innovative" programs in white and other schools and come away disappointed. DQU offers a refreshing contrast).

Conclusions

The field of "community development," as it relates to Indian and Chicano communities, is littered with failures in spite of a considerable outlay of funds. We believe that these failures stem largely from the fact that "elitist" outside intervention strategies almost never generate the self-development, motivation and expertise necessary for any long-term on-going developmental process.

The D-Q movement can be characterized as a democratic, indigenous, "grassroots" phenomenon typified, nonetheless, by sophistication and expertise. This combination of a "people's movement" with sophisticated strategy is, of course, not unique, being typical also of the Chicano-led United Farm Worker's Organizing Committee.

The availability of "expertise" is clearly necessary in any community development (or organizing) activity. The difference between a successful and an unsuccessful movement rests largely on the question of whether or not the "experts" are part of, and subordinate to, the "people" or whether they are outsiders or elitists. Also, of course, a considerable elan must be created in any successful activity, and that can usually only come when a movement is led by native persons who can truly comprehend the culture, value, and "gut" aspirations of the people in question.

In sum, the establishment of D-Q University clearly shows what democratic community self-development strategy and method can achieve, especially when contrasted with the monumental failures of well-funded elitist "aid" and development programs.

JDF/KRM/DR/ph